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Abstract 
One of the key requirements to a successful Public-private Partnership (PPP) 
is the transfer of risk from the government to the private sector.  This research 
examines the PPP experience in the United Kingdom (UK) Ministry of Defense to 
determine if they would be applicable to the US Department of Defense (DoD).  PPP 
agreements have provided the UK increased capabilities.  Also, this research 
provides an in-depth analysis of Private Financed Initiatives (PFI) that Serco Inc. has 
undertaken.  Finally, this research evaluates the increases in value-for-money 
resulting from the PPP transfer of risk to the private sector.   
The research concludes that PPPs should be continued and expanded to 
provide increased real-time capability to the DoD while supporting private industry.   
Since the government has the lowest cost of borrowing, PPPs agreements may not 
appear to be cost effective as a means of procurement.  However, the benefits from 
transferring risk to the private sector can more than offset the higher financing cost.  
PPPs reallocate risk and up-front capital requirements allowing the government to 
spread program cost over time.  Without initial capital outlays, the government can 
acquire higher priority goods and services with its limited resources.  In addition, 
PPPs provide the government with an increased infrastructure and technological 
capability than would otherwise not be available.   
Keywords: Public Private Partnership, PPP, Energy Savings Performance 
Contracts (ESPCs) for mobile assets, Privatization, Outsourcing, B-52H re-engining 
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Executive Summary 
There is clearly heavy pressure in Washington to limit the DoD acquisition 
budget.  Yet, a steady stream of “critically important” new weapons systems is under 
development across all branches of the military.  The result will necessarily be that 
many “highly desirable,” if not “critical,” programs are cut back or even eliminated. 
One way to ease this potential impairment of National Security is to fund 
some DoD investments outside the normal Congressional appropriations process.  
One term for such alternative financing mechanisms is “Public-private Partnerships” 
(PPP).  PPPs have generated substantial benefits for the public sector by:  providing 
greater financing flexibility, encouraging innovation, reducing risks, and saving time 
and money on projects.  Acquiring combat capability through PPPs is an innovate 
approach that has the potential to foster efficiency, flexibility, and creativity in the 
DoD acquisition process. 
This report examines the use of Public-private Partnerships (PPPs) in the 
United Kingdom (UK), a country that has developed an acceptance and appreciation 
of PPPs to provide greater value for its citizens.  We will address the concepts of risk 
transfer and an economic tool called the Public-sector Comparator (PSC) that is 
used in the UK.  The PSC evaluates the value gained in the transfer of risk to the 
private sector and determines whether traditional procurement or PPP is the better 
solution.  A case study illustrates the application of the risk transfer and the PSC.   
The DoD has not yet used the PSC to evaluate the risk of PPPs. This 
research supports full consideration of the transfer of risk and use of the PSC in 
overcoming some of the obstacles to PPPs.  In an era of funding reductions, the use 
of PPPs has the potential to provide the DoD with required combat capabilities in a 
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Introduction 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) involve private sector supply of assets and 
services that have traditionally been provided by the government.  PPPs allow a 
public agency to access the private sector’s technical expertise, knowledge, insight, 
and capital to achieve mutually beneficial goals.  These partnerships have proven to 
be advantageous to both the government and private sector and, as a result, have 
been widely used in a number of countries. 
Using a “full funding” policy, Congress has traditionally authorized and 
appropriated the full cost of the defense requirement in the budget request, rather 
than incrementally funding the requirement over its life, as would be the case in 
PPPs.  However, providing budget authority for the large up-front costs of capital 
assets creates challenges when resources are constrained—as they potentially will 
be with the steady stream of “critically important” new weapons systems under 
development across all branches of the military.  One way to ease this potential 
impairment of National Security is to fund some DoD investments through PPPs.  
PPPs have generated substantial benefits for the public sector by providing greater 
flexibility in financing, encouraging innovation, reducing risks, and saving time and 
money on projects.   Acquiring combat capability through PPPs is an innovate 
approach that has the potential to foster efficiency, flexibility, and creativity in the 
acquisition process. 
Some argue that PPPs bypass Congressional oversight, reduce spending 
controls, and move public investment off budget and debt off the government 
balance sheet, while the government still bears most of the fiscal risk.  Therefore, 
adequate risk transfer from the government to the private sector is a key 
requirement if PPPs are to deliver high-quality and cost-effective assets to the 
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The purpose of this report is to examine, through a case study, the successful 
experiences of the United Kingdom’s (UK) use of PPPs and Public Financing 
Initiatives (PFIs), a form of PPPs, in acquiring defense capabilities.  The UK uses an 
economic tool call the Public-sector Comparator (PSC) to better compare the value 
gained in the transfer of risk and determine whether traditional procurement or PPPs 
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Basic Features of Public-private Partnerships 
The National Council for Public-private Partnerships defines PPPs as follows: 
A Public-private Partnership is a contractual agreement between a 
public agency (federal, state or local) and a private sector entity.  
Through this agreement, the skills and assets of each sector (public 
and private) are shared in delivering a service or facility for the use of 
the general public.  In addition to the sharing of resources, each party 
shares in the risks and rewards potential in the delivery of the service 
and/or facility (National Council for Public-private Partnerships, 2006). 
Figure 1 (US Department of Transportation, 2004) displays the complete 
spectrum of PPPs in relation to the risk incurred by the public or private organization.  
The PPP continuum begins with simple service relationships that exist today and 
ends with private firms procuring government hardware and providing support 
services.  Value-for-money exists throughout the range of partnerships based on the 
program requirements.  The left end of the spectrum, Design/Bid/Build, represents 
full public responsibility and ensuing risk.  The right side of the spectrum, 
Build/Own/Operate, similarly represents full private responsibility and associated 
risk.  When evaluating PPP contracts, determining who bears what responsibility is 
critical in determining value-for-money.  In this case, responsibility and level of risk 
incurred is synonymous.  The following paragraphs will further explain the spectrum 
of PPPs.  The discussion will begin with the highest risk borne by the government, 
Design/Bid/Build, transitioning through the risk spectrum, and ending with risk being 
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The Design/Bid/Build relationship is the traditional method used in 
government procurement.  This is a PPP in that the government negotiates with 
private industry to complete a project rather than the government completing the 
project in house.  This method is seen predominantly in the procurement of aviation 
assets.   
Private Contract Fee Services: 
The “fee-for-service” contract is also known as “outsourcing.”  Private firms 
are engaged to perform services necessary to the operation of the government.  
Generally, any service not considered “inherently governmental” can be bundled in a 
fee-for-service contract.  This method is becoming commonplace throughout the 
public sector, as government agencies divest themselves of activities which are not 
within the government’s core competence, such as janitorial services, food and 
beverage service, and security forces.   
Design/Build: 
The Design/Build partnership is a modification of the Design/Bid/Build 
partnership.  The Design/Build model combines the design and building phases into 
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up-front capital requirements, but shifts some of the risk/responsibility for design to 
the private builder. 
Build/Operate/Transfer: 
The Build/Operate/Transfer model or Government-owned, Contractor-
operated (GOCO) model provides a bundle of services to the public agency.  The 
private-sector partner is responsible for the construction, operation, and 
maintenance of the project.  The public entity provides the up-front capital to build 
the asset and the funding stream to maintain the project.  The added benefit to the 
public sector is that the acquisition and lifecycle support cost is fulfilled by a single 
contractor for a fee. 
Design/Build/Finance/Operate: 
The Design/Build/Finance/Operate model bundles the total project cost in a 
single comprehensive program.  This partnership provides shared financial 
responsibility for the ownership of the total program.   It is a modification of GOCO; 
here, the private agency provides some debt and equity financing for the project in 
return for future income streams.  These partnerships have enjoyed considerable 
success at the municipal level in completing bridges  and highways.  Private 
companies are contracted by the local government to design, build, and operate 
public roads in return for a portion of future toll revenue.  This type of partnership 
may also take the form of Contractor-owned, Government-operated (COGO) if the 
financing were structured in favor of primary private ownership.   
Build/Own/Operate:  
Build/Own/Operate is the consummate PPP in which major responsibility for 
financing, operating, and maintaining the project is contracted to the private 
organization.  Commonly referred to as a Contractor-owned, Contractor-operated 
(COCO) partnership, this arrangement places the full up-front capital and cost 
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secured future income stream.  In the UK, this model is also referred to as a Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI).  
This research evaluates the application of the Design/Build/Operate (COGO) 
and Build/Own/Operate models (COCO).  The difference between the models lies in 
the financing mechanisms employed.  The PFI/COCO model retains private 
ownership, whereas the GOCO allows for public ownership with some use of private 
financing.  The British Ministry of Defense (MoD) used this model in procuring 
helicopter simulation facilities and a world-renowned joint service staff college.  Both 
projects were entered into by the MoD and a consortium of private firms.  Upon 
completion, the facilities are owned and operated by the private firms to provide a 
service for a fee to the government.   The helicopter simulation facility project will be 
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Risk Transfer 
Optimal sharing of risks between the private and public sector is important to 
realizing the best value-for-money in a PPP arrangement.  There are certain risks 
that are best managed by the Government, and transferring these risks would either 
not be viable or not offer value-for-money to the public sector.   
PPPs have been successfully used in a number of countries, including the 
UK.  Its use of Public Financing Initiatives (PFIs), a form of PPPs, comprises about 
11% of the country’s budget.  The UK’s Ministry of Defense (MoD) has 46 PFI 
projects that constitute over 8% of their defense budget. Their success has been 
noted in a report released by HM Treasury (the UK equivalent of the GAO) based on 
investigations of 61 PFI projects. The key findings were:  
• 89% of projects were delivered on-time or early. 
• All PFI projects in the HM Treasury sample were delivered within public-
sector budgets. No PFI project was found where the unitary charge had 
changed following contract signature—other than where user requirements 
changed. 
• 77% of public-sector managers stated that their project was meeting their 
initial expectations. (HM Treasury, 2003) 
It appears that, when risks are shared, projects are more likely to be 
completed on-time and on budget.  Given the success of PFIs in the UK, the next 
section examines the UK’s approach to risk allocation and how this impacts 
financing new assets outside of the traditional procurement stream. 
Background 
In the UK, Public-private Partnerships are split into three distinct categories.  
The first and largest category includes the Private Finance Initiative (PFI).  In these 
arrangements, the public sector purchases goods or services on a long-term basis to 
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their own money at risk.  This includes projects where the private-sector partner is 
responsible for providing a public service, including maintaining, enhancing, or 
constructing the necessary infrastructure or assets.   
The second PPP category includes a strategic private partner with either a 
majority or minority equity stake in a state-owned business.  The third PPP category 
involves selling government services into wider markets and other partnership 
arrangements where private-sector expertise and financing are used to exploit the 
commercial potential of government assets.   
PFIs are used in the UK to finance large capital assets and services in 
situations that offer the best value-for-money, similar to the concept of lower lifecycle 
costs in the US acquisition cycle.  Similar to the US, the UK recognizes that major 
capital asset procurement must include the cost of the asset’s entire lifecycle.  
Therefore, the lowest cost bidder does not necessarily win the contract.  Also, the 
PFI’s value-for-money benefits should not result from worker layoffs or decreased 
employee quality of life.  
The UK defines “value for money” as follows: “the optimum combination of 
whole-life cost and quality (or fitness for purpose) to meet the user requirement” (HM 
Treasury, 2003).  This does not allow bias to influence which procurement option is 
best for the specific need—whether it is prime contracting, design-and-build 
contracting, or PFI.  To ensure that PFI is the best option, the UK Government 
undertakes a full evaluation of the costs and benefits including an assessment of risk 
to both the government and the contractor.   
Since, in a PFI, the private sector takes responsibility for the quality of design 
and construction and for long-term maintenance on an asset, the transfer of risk 
helps create value-for-money.  Therefore, in a perfect PFI scenario, value-for-money 
is achieved primarily through proper transfer of risk to the party in the best position 
to limit that risk.  The government retains risk of contract change to keep flexibility 
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to an already designed platform.  The valuation of these risk transfers makes these 
arrangements attractive to the public sector.  This concept was used to justify the 
use of PFIs to finance the UK Medium-support Helicopter Aircrew Training Facility.  
This report will discuss the UK Medium-support Helicopter Aircrew Training Facility 
following a presentation of important concepts related to risk and its evaluation.   
Risk Sharing 
Optimal sharing of risks between the private and public sectors is important to 
realizing the best value-for-money of any PFI arrangement.  However, there are 
certain risks that are best managed by the Government.   Transferring these risks to 
the private sector would either not be viable or not result in the best value-for-money 
to the public sector.  When risks are shared, projects are more likely to be completed 
on-time and on budget. Therefore, in the next sections, the UK’s approach to the 
assumption of risk by the government and the private sector and cost of risk are 
examined. 
Government Risk 
The general principles behind the Government’s approach to risk-sharing in 
PFI relationships are as follows: 
• The Government underwrites the continuity of public services, and the 
availability of the assets essential to their delivery. 
• The private-sector contractor is responsible, and at risk, for its ability to meet 
the service requirements it has contractually agreed to provide.  
• The full value of that debt incurred by the project, and the equity provided by 
contractors and third parties, is the cap on the risk assumed by the private 
sector. (HM Treasury, 2003) 
The UK government retains risk in five areas much the same way a public 
entity would in normal procurement.  The first is associated with date and adequacy 
for delivery.  For instance, if the construction of a warship did not have enough of a 
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cost associated with adding more capability. The second is the possibility of a future 
change in public-sector requirements.  The government retains the responsibility to 
make alterations within provisions set forth in the contract,  but will incur the cost of 
making  changes requested after signing the contract.  In the third area, the public-
sector retains the risk involved in planning and procuring public services that meet 
public needs.  The fourth area involves the extent to which an asset is used over the 
contract’s life.  This primarily deals with land-based facilities.  However, this can be 
applied to capital assets such as transport planes, trucks, etc.  Finally, the 
government retains the risk of general inflation. 
Private-sector Risk 
Risks that are transferred by contract to the private sector are explicitly 
identified and limited.  They typically apply to contract terms of 15-30 years and 
cover five areas (HM Treasury, 2003).  First, the required standards of delivery must 
be satisfied.  If the project’s design (as determined by the private sector) does not 
provide the required service’s needs, the private sector pays the cost of correcting 
the design to meet contractual specifications.  This implies that all specifications are 
identified at project inception.  Therefore, this type of financing is best used for 
projects of a specified duration and that uses mature technology.  PFI financing 
would be difficult for projects with high technology development costs because the 
Research and Development program for a specific technology can experience many 
unpredictable set backs and cost overruns.   
Second, responsibility for a cost overrun during construction must be noted.  
For instance, if after approval of the design and construction plans, it is discovered 
that more physical support is needed for the weight of a ship system, then the 
private sector pays the cost to correct the deficiency to comply with standards.  In 
conventional procurement, the government would be forced to pay the charges.  
Third, the private sector’s risk associated with the timely completion of a 
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increase its profit through early-completion bonus payments. However, if the project 
is completed late, the private sector incurs the extra cost.   
Fourth, the private sector shares the total risk due to underlying costs and the 
future costs associated with the asset with the operator of the service.  This occurs 
when the private sector assumes the risk of any latent defects in an acquired PFI 
asset.  The private sector bears the cost of remedies needed to bring the asset to its 
contractual standards.  For example, in providing refueling tankers, the private entity 
(as the “owner”) would assume the costs of the upkeep of the aircraft and assume 
the risk of defect upon delivery from the aircraft manufacturer.  Finally, the private 
sector bears the risk of physical damage to the asset while it is in their custody. 
The total risk assigned to private-sector entities is in turn assigned to the 
various private contractors as each assumes its respective portion of the project.  
Figure 2 shows the structure of a typical PFI and how the risk is allocated to the 
parties involved in a project (HM Treasury, 2003).   
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In this structure, the private sector reallocates risk to subcontractors, the most 
appropriate parties to mitigate risks. Typically: 
• The construction contractor, under a subcontract with the consortium 
company, has the design, construction and completion risk; 
• The service provider, or facilities management operator, under a subcontract 
with the consortium company, is assigned the risk of timely and cost-effective 
service provision; 
• Insurers provide protection for risks of damage and business interruption; and 
• The consortium company, the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), its lenders and 
investors are, therefore, left with a series of residual risks, some of which are 
credit risks on the subcontractors’ performance. 
The benefits of this consortium joint-venture structure are that it permits 
different parties to become involved in the PFI and share the risks effectively. It also 
can involve third parties, such as financiers, who must assess the strength of the 
contractual arrangements and the level of support offered as they estimate the 
likelihood of repayment of their loans (HM Treasury, 2003).   
The PFI contract usually stipulates that the government can change the 
design or capability to provide the government flexibility and public-sector 
safeguards.  However, the government will bear the cost of the changes.  In the 
event of poor performance, the contract stipulates that the SPV can hire and fire 
subcontractors, and the government can withhold payments.  The revenue loss from 
deductions and penalties provides a powerful incentive for the PFI contractor to 
correct deficiencies.   
The repercussions of the PFI’s lost revenue are significant because 
shareholders’ returns will decline.  In addition, third party creditors’ (i.e., banks) risk 
may increase if the PFI contractor is unable to meet its debt service payments.   
Creditors have contractual rights over the other private-sector participants to enforce 
performance. For example, they can replace private-sector participants with other 
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such as total failure of the private sector, the government retains the right to transfer 
the entire program from the PFI umbrella.   Normally, upon expiration of a standard 
PFI contract, the key assets needed to continue to deliver public services revert to 
the public sector free of charge (HM Treasury, 2003).  In the US, the government 
would likely pay the contractor a portion of the asset’s useful value or its salvage 
value.  
Cost of Risk 
Private contractors, equity investors and bankers evaluate the cost of risk in a 
PFI contract by discounting all future cash flows at a specified discount rate—which 
includes an implied risk premium that is assessed to the project.  This rate is usually 
much higher than the government’s risk-free borrowing rate.   In a 2001 GAO study, 
it was determined that the promise of an internal rate of return of approximately 15% 
would draw considerable interest from the private sector (Ungar, 2001).   
A common view is that these financing arrangements with the private sector 
are inherently bad for the government because the government has the lowest “risk-
free” cost of capital.  However, the HM Treasury reported that the taxpayer 
underwrites the risk associated with publicly financed procurement projects.  This 
risk is then captured in a lower cost of capital to the government.  Taxpayers bear 
the risk when a cost overrun occurs due to a construction set back.    It is, therefore, 
inappropriate to compare a “risk-free” cost of capital with the private-sector cost of 
capital.  PFI projects provide better value-for-money because the private sector 
assumes project pricing and risk.  This cost savings is then passed onto the 
government (HM Treasury, 2003). 
PFI risks are priced individually for each project option.  The discounted costs 
of these risk-adjusted options can then be compared to accept the best project or 
option in light of risk and uncertainty.  HM Treasury found that in traditional public 
procurement, the public sector pays for risk not in its borrowing cost, but when the 
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The Public-sector Comparator 
One major difficulty in comparing the value of a lease to the value of a direct 
purchase is valuing the allocation of risk.  It is easy to compare the two alternatives 
using discounted annual cash flows and the net present value associated with each.  
However, in quantifying the greatest advantage associated with a lease, valuing the 
allocation of risk is not so easy.  The Public-sector comparator (PSC) quantifies the 
value of this transfer of risk and assigns a monetary value to determine which 
proposal delivers the greater value-for-money.   
During the early 1990s, Great Britain had a variety of public goods needing 
refurbishment, but the government did not want to significantly increase taxes or the 
national debt (HM Treasury, 2003).  The government’s answer was to embrace 
PPPs ( or PFIs, as it calls them) to make the improvements.  Great Britain was not a 
stranger to privatizing public goods, but still faced a major obstacle in the 
acceptance of PPPs.  The greatest difficulty was proving that a greater value of 
money could be earned in a PPP than a traditional procurement program.  This proof 
was provided by the PSC. 
Components of the PSC 
The goal of the PSC is to improve the comparison of the purchase and PPP 
options.  In order to more accurately depict the costs and benefits of each financing 
option, it is important to consider all the costs and benefits of each.  A PSC is a 
function of four variables expressed as follows (State of Victoria, 2001): 
PSC = Transferable risk + Competitive Neutrality + Raw PSC + Retained Risk 
Each of the above four variables constitutes a portion of the value of the 
contract and is important to consider when evaluating the value of a PPPs.  These 
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Competitive Neutrality 
Competitive neutrality is an attempt to negate any financial advantages or 
disadvantages the government enjoys over the private sector.  For instance, the 
government does not pay taxes—giving it an advantage over the private sector.  
Conversely, a private firm will not face the scrutiny that a public sector project may 
face. 
Raw PSC 
The Raw PSC is an estimate of the government’s cost in a traditional 
procurement.  The Raw PSC is comprised of three variables: capital costs, operating 
costs, and third-party revenue.  As shown in the equation below (State of Victoria, 
2001), these are the values used in comparing lease-versus-buy alternatives: 
Raw PSC = (Operating Costs – Third-party Revenue) + Capital Cost    
Operating Costs and Capital Costs are associated with the purchase, 
operation, and maintenance of the good or service.  Capital costs are all costs 
(direct and indirect) that are associated with providing the good or service.  Third-
party revenue is that revenue that may be lost by a government-owned facility which 
provided services to the private sector.  For instance, if the government is deciding 
whether to privatize a shipyard and pay a private firm for services or maintain a 
government-operated shipyard, the potential lost revenue from services the 
government may provide to the commercial sector may be subtracted from the costs 
of operating the shipyard.   
Transferable Risk 
Transferring risk to the party best able to mitigate that risk is one of the 
greatest advantages of a PPP and one of the most often overlooked variables by 
those opposed to PPPs as a method of procurement.  By transferring the risks to 
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for-money.  An increased value-for-money for the public sector and profit for the 
private sector is a winning situation for all parties involved. 
Retained Risk 
Retained Risk represents the cost associated with risk that the will be 
assumed by the government.  The key for a successful PFI is to transfer the risk to 
the party best able to mitigate that risk, as shown in Figure 3 (State of Victoria, 2001) 
Figure 3. Optimal Risk Allocation 
 
With Value-for-money depicted on the vertical axis and Risk allocation on the 
horizontal access, the curved line represents how the value-for-money increases as 
risk is transferred among parties.  The value-for-money increases rapidly until the 
optimal risk transfer point is met and then the amount of risk transfer begins to 
adversely affect the value-for-money.   At the optimal point, risk is properly 
distributed among parties, and all parties receive the maximum benefit. 
Calculating Risk 
The dispersion of risks throughout the parties in a government project may be 
a great advantage for the PPP options, but it is also very difficult to accurately 
quantify risks.    An effective means of establishing a baseline level for risk follows 
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1. Identify risks 
2. Quantify consequences associated with each risk 
3. Estimate the probability of each risk occurring 
4. Calculate the value of risk   
Identifying risks 
The risks associated with a project may range from those associated with the 
contract and financing to those incurred during construction, operation, or possible 
destruction.  It is important to develop a list of risks incurred at every step in the 
procurement process.  This task can be more easily accomplished using subject 
matter experts and/or consultants. 
Quantifying Consequences 
Quantifying the consequences may be even more subjective than identifying 
the risks of the project.  Determining point estimates may be extremely difficult and 
may represent a “best guess” in a given scenario.  Either a risk matrix or historical 
data is used for estimations, but the goal should be to develop a reasonable 
assessment of possible consequences of specific risks, not a concrete value for the 
potential cost to the government. 
Probability of risk   
The probability of risk is best explained as the likelihood that the specific risk 
will be realized.  There are a variety of methods for developing these values, but the 
process is subjective.  However, it is better to attempt to value additional costs and 
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The Value of the Public-sector comparator 
As depicted in Figure 4 (State of Victoria, 2001), the sum of the four PSC 
components are equal to the real costs associated with a given project.   
Figure 4.  Components of PSC 
 
Figure 4 shows the PSC option and two different bids compared with the 
procurement option for a given project.  The PSC bid depicts the expected cost of 
the project divided into its four elements.  The two alternative bids only depict the 
overall expected cost for each bid.  The PSC helps the government determine the 
true value of a PPP bid.  Without considering the risks associated with service and 
acquisition, the true costs to the government are not reflected in the procurement 
option, which may appear to be the better option.  By explicitly stating its risks, the 
government is better able to compare all the costs associated with procurement and 
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Medium-support Helicopter Aircrew Training Facility (MSHATF) 
CASE STUDY 
This section presents a case study to illustrate the application of risk transfer, 
the PCS model, partner relationships and responsibilities, and financial analysis.  
Serco, Inc., one of the partners in this project, provided information and their insights 
to prepare this case study.  Serco pioneered the Private Finance Initiative in the UK 
and has 600 existing contracts in over 35 countries, employing over 35,000 
personnel worldwide (Serco.com, 2005).  
Background 
The medium-support helicopter training facility (MSHTF) located at Royal Air 
Force (RAF) Benson teaches all facets of aviation to RAF helicopter Pilots.  The 
facility is equipped with a tactical control center designed to simulate a military flying 
environment, computer-based trainers to support ground school, and six fully 
integrated motion control helicopter simulators.  The training staff is comprised 
entirely of civilian helicopter pilots and qualified ground-training instructors.   
The primary objective of the facility is to reduce the flight-hour requirements of 
the actual flying squadrons.  The medium-lift helicopter mission requirements are 
tactically diverse.  The missions require crews to operate tactically under low-light 
conditions in potentially hostile environments.  Simulator flight training reduces the 
risk inherent with operating an aircraft in real conditions.  The RAF can generate 
cost savings by reducing flight hours and eliminating the risk associated with 
operating fleet aircraft in dangerous training environments.  The project viability rests 
in the cost savings generated by the aircraft flight hours saved coupled with the 
efficiencies gained through using commercial sources to run the project. 
Issues and Scope 
The Ministry of Defense (MoD) Procurement Agency identified a genuine 
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developing an analysis of alternatives, the MoD identified three potential courses of 
action (HM Treasury Task Force, 1999):  
1.  Do nothing—continue using current training devices until beyond repair 
and then purchase new devices.   
2.  Provide for the minimum requirements—meet the need half way and 
limit the financial breadth of the contract.   
3.  Provide for the training needs as evaluated. 
The third option was chosen based on an internal analysis of the economic 
value gained.  However, the economic value gained is contingent upon the “quality” 
and “usage” of the simulators being negotiated.  These are key cost drivers that 
require considerable capital expenditure at the inception of the project.  Due to the 
large capital outlay necessary for construction and constrained financial resources 
typically confronting government agencies, the MoD identified a Private Finance 
Initiative as a viable option.  Additionally, the MoD firmly believes that incorporating 
the private sector in all aspects of procurement can be beneficial.  Sir Robert 
Walmsley, Chief Executive of the Defense Procurement Agency, states: “A 
significant outcome has been to show that the role of the private sector in defense 
can be widened through the use of PFI contracts, and that substantial value-for-
money improvements can be achieved” (HM Treasury Task Force, 1999). 
CVS is a partnership consisting of three companies: CAE Electronics, 
simulator manufacturer; Vega Group, computer technology provider; and Serco, 
facility operators and aviation-expertise provider.  The contract was awarded to CVS 
in October 1997 by the Defense Procurement Agency (DPA) to design, build, and 
operate the medium-support helicopter training facility.   This contract embodies the 
pure definition of a Contractor-owned, Contractor-operated (COCO) relationship. 
CVS will undertake the entire project—including soliciting private institutions to 
provide the necessary equity to finance the building phase.  The alternative option 
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owned, Contractor-operated (GOCO) format in which the government agency   
provides the required capital in the first year.   
The following equipment and services were to be provided to the MoD (HM 
Treasury Task Force, 1999): 
• 3 Chinook HC Mk 2 Dynamic Mission Simulators 
• 2 Merlin HC Mk 3 Dynamic Mission Simulators 
• 1 Puma HC Mk 1 Dynamic Mission Simulators 
• Aircrew CRM training 
• Computer-based Training Package for Chinook and Merlin 
• Comprehensive Ground School 
• Local Area Network Connectivity for Multiple Unit Simulation 
• Facilities and Support for the Simulators and Ground School 
The helicopter training facility and associated support structures are located at 
RAF Benson in Oxfordshire, UK. The simulator facility location was chosen in order 
to optimize training and minimize traveling time to operational airfields.  The Merlin 
and Puma aircraft currently operate from RAF Benson while the Chinook aircraft  are 
flown in from RAF Odiham (50 Km South of Benson).  Aircraft proximity to the 
training facility is a critical part of the contract. 
The MoD clearly stated that a large component of the comparative analysis 
should include the fuel cost savings from using simulators vice aircraft.  However, at 
the conclusion of simulator and ground-school training, students must qualify in 
actual fleet aircraft.  Long transit times that cannot be used for training purposes 
simply increase the overhead cost involved and detract from the viability of the 
project. 
Contract 
The MoD entered into a 40-year contract with CVS and is obligated to 20 
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reevaluated at the completion of the first 20-year portion.  The MoD is not obligated 
to continue after the first 20 years, and can cancel without financial recourse.  The 
contract, from the MoD point of view, is designed to provide a service for a fee.  The 
MoD, in essence, is purchasing a capability rather than procuring a simulator facility.  
The construction risk and success of training efficiencies are placed on the 
contractor.  Payments on the contract are based on MoD actual usage, quality of 
product, and availability.  The MoD is billed at an agreed-upon rate based on 
anticipated usage.  The hourly rate is gradually reduced over time through the 20th 
year of the contract.  The decreasing fee was imposed by the banks due to the initial 
capital requirement (Symes, 2006).   The MoD is billed proportionally to the hours 
used in excess usage or penalized for under usage.  Similarly, the contractor is 
penalized for lack of quality service or inability to provide training when it is 
scheduled.  This payment scheme incentivizes both parties to maximize potential 
usage of the assets.   
Additionally, due to the cyclic nature of MoD requirements, the contract was 
designed for only 80% of the actual MoD usage requirement.  Even if the MoD 
required 100% of its contractual obligation, one-third facility capacity would still be 
available for CVS to solicit third-party usage.  Third-party facility usage is beneficial 
to both the MoD and CVS because outside revenue is divided proportionally 
between the MoD and CVS.  The MoD retains priority over simulator services.  A 
multi-party initiative such as this provides the potential for underutilized government 
assets (land) to be tied to procurement projects with revenue offsets, helping reduce 
the overall cost to the government.  PPPs help take advantage of underutilized 
government capacity.   
Contractor   
The contractor, CVS, can be divided into two separate companies with 
different contractual obligations.  In order to understand stakeholder requirements 
and incentives in relation to the contractor, the role of the asset and individual 
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equity shareholders, debt providers (banks), and the contracting agency (MoD).  
Figure 5 graphically represents the relationships between participating entities (HM 
Treasury Task Force, 1999). 












The asset company is responsible for financing, designing, building, owning 
the facilities, leasing the land, purchasing the simulators, and purchasing the 
computer equipment.  It is also the primary conduit for the financing liability.  The 
primary contracting companies will act as sales agents; CAE will sell the simulators; 
and Vega will sell the computer equipment to the asset company.   
The primary companies involved in the contract (CAE, Vega, Serco) are tied 
directly to CVS via equity investments made at project inception.  The primary 
contractors, in concert with Charterhouse Capital, Inc., provided 20% of the required 
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loans from a consortium of six banks, with HSBC as the leading bank (Symes, 
2006).  The asset company unifies the primary contractor’s liabilities as a single 
entity, which is just a subdivision of CVS Aircrew.  However, the division of asset 
and operating companies shields the MoD and contractor consortium from the 
liabilities.  This model affords the primary contracting companies the opportunity to 
retain project ownership and yet minimize their exposure to debt risk.   
The asset company, once fully developed, entered into a lease agreement 
with the operating company.  Both companies are subdivisions of CVS.  The lease 
agreement between the asset and operating companies is essentially a funds 
transfer to satisfy senior debt payments (bank loan) and distribute interest on 
dividends to the equity partners.  The asset company is invisible to the MoD and 
operates independently of the operating company, but is connected to the MoD via 
liabilities documents discussed later.   
Operating Company 
The operating company is the link between the contractor consortium and the 
MoD.  It is the face of CVS and is responsible for soliciting business from either the 
MoD contract or third-party interests.  The operating company is responsible for 
facilities maintenance, simulator maintenance, ground school administration, 
simulator scheduling and administration, and providing instructors. The operating 
company will subcontract the day-to-day services necessary to sustain operations.  
Unlike the asset company, the operating company may award fifty or more 
subcontracts for necessary services.  For the MSHATF, the primary subcontracts 
were awarded to Serco, CAE, and associated partners for maintenance and 
manpower.   
Additionally, the operating company is responsible for administering the 
contract with the MoD.  Primary contract administration services are also 
subcontracted and include quality assurance, revenue collection, and dispute 
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contract because payments are made to a private company for services without 
ownership.  
Finally, the operating company is also the agency responsible for soliciting 
third-party usage and allocating the resulting profit.  Part of the revenue generated is 
used to offset the MoD cost, as per the primary contract.  However, the remainder is 
pure profit because there are no additional costs incurred.  The third-party usage 
charge is $1,500 per hour or more, and the charge is traditionally booked in two-hour 
increments or greater (Symes, 2006).  As discussed previously, this option could be 
quite lucrative to both the MoD and CVS.     
Banks 
The banks entered into a credit agreement with the asset company to provide 
capital for 80% of the asset value.  To provide the line of credit, the banks required a 
20% equity participation and a “tripartite agreement” with the MoD and operating 
company.  The bank consortium deemed it necessary to contractually allocate risk 
equitably to all parties. The asset company generates revenue from the lease 
agreement with the operating company.  The operating company is bound by 
contract to the MoD to provide a service for a fee.  However, by implementing a 
tripartite agreement, the MoD and the bank consortium become bound in the event 
the MoD exercises an option to exit the contract within the first 20 years of service 
(Symes, 2006).  Additionally, the private companies must complete a detailed 
financial analysis to sell the concept to private banks.  This detailed financial 
analysis and evaluation of risk required by the banks is essential to the growth of PFI 
projects.  
Equity Shareholders 
The primary equity shareholders are the three contract companies (CAE, 
Vega, Serco) with Charterhouse Capital as a third-party interest.  CAE holds the 
majority of equity interest (10%) with Serco trailing as the minority (1.8%) equity 
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The three contracting companies play an additional role as service providers 
over the life of the contract.  The service package is critical to understanding value-
for-money from the private company’s perspective.  Without the service package, 
there is no need for a long-term contract, and the arrangement is similar to an 
outright purchase.  The contract length and service requirements are private 
industry’s reward for risk incurred by providing the up-front capital.  The mechanism 
that connects the service providers with the equity shareholders is the operating 
company.  The operating company provides for services by entering into contracts 
with the equity providers for building maintenance, instructor pilots, and various 
services. 
The risk associated with design and construction—as well as interest rate 
fluctuations—is assigned to the asset company.  The asset company generates 
equity growth for the shareholders after bank interest payments are satisfied.  The 
equity growth is independent of any fee-for-service contracts levied by the operating 
company.  The value-for-money to the CVS consortium is the equity return from the 
long-term fee-for-service contracts.  
Ministry of Defense (MoD) 
The MoD bears no liability for asset ownership, facility maintenance cost, 
procurement cost, etc., during or at the end of the contractually obligated period 
(initially 20 years).  The service fee MoD pays to CVS, the operating company, is 
based on actual usage rates and is downward adjusted over time with offsets from 
third-party usage.  In keeping with standard fee-for-service contract obligations, the 
MoD is penalized for scheduled time not used, early exit of the contract, and 
changes to training not specifically stipulated in the original contract.  However, 
since the PFI is a service contract, the MoD bears no responsibility of ownership or 
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Risk Transfer 
The transfer of risk from the public to private sector ensures the MSHATF 
project’s value-for-money.  The most significant level of risk transferred is in two 
categories: construction-project overruns and performance justification.  Government 
procurement has a long-standing tradition of soliciting the lowest bid contract, not 
best value, often resulting in significant schedule slippage and cost overrun.  The 
PFI/PPP model transfers the initial high-risk portion of the acquisition, where the 
large up-front capital requirement exists, to the private sector.  The private sector 
has, over time, developed effective risk matrices and is efficient in dealing with this 
environment.  Thus, the true value-for-money does not lie in a dollar-for-dollar 
financing comparison, but in the cost of risk avoided.    
Public-sector comparator Analysis 
The MSHATF project, in keeping with MoD finance department regulations, 
was evaluated against a Public-sector comparator (PSC) designed exclusively to 
evaluate this project.  The PSC and contractors independently evaluated the project 
on a full-cost basis—including cost of capital, physical construction cost, and risk 
incurred.  The primary difference between the contractor evaluation and the PSC is 
the risk assignment at project inception.  The most significant risks to be valued and 
added to the PSC were: 
• Construction Overruns.  The main risks that were not addressed in 
cost terms by a conventional fixed-price contract were planning risks 
and delay in entry into service.  Because of the greater incentive to 
deliver on-time inherent in a PFI contract, it was assumed that any 
delay in entry into service would be significantly shorter under PFI than 
under conventional procurement.   
• Performance Failures.  Down time of the simulators was expected to 
be much less under the PFI than under conventional procurement 
because of the greater penalties/incentives under the PFI contract. 
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From the government perspective, the true value-for-money proposition is 
transferring project ownership to the private sector during high-risk evolutions.  The 
private sector, in turn, solicits debt and equity providers to evaluate and enter into 
project ownership.  Because of the number of private parties involved, the project is 
evaluated numerous times and must withstand a high level of financial inquiry.  The 
primary reason for the difference in evaluation techniques is the different goals of the 
government and private industry.  The former is concerned with reducing cost, while 
the latter is focused on maximizing profit.  For these reasons, the MSHATF contract 
shifted the high-risk portion of the project to the private sector, but provided fiscal 
incentives for the private contractor to deliver on-target and on-price.  Additionally, 
the nature of the project led to further risk sharing between the MoD and CVS.  A 
break down of the risk-sharing matrix used for the MSHATF contract can be found in 
Appendix I (HM Treasury Task Force 22).   
Analysis and Results 
The MSHATF contract was awarded in October 1997 at a value of $605 
million for the first 20 years of contract life (HM Treasury Task Force, 1999).   The 
MoD evaluated several different PSC risk profiles.   The MoD valued the contract 
between $695 million to $726 million.   Both the PSC and contractor analysis 
assumed the same MoD utilization rates (80%), 66% capacity available for third-
party usage, and a 6% discount rate provided by the treasury (HM Treasury Task 
Force, 1999).  Ultimately, the PFI model proved to be the optimal financing 
mechanism, besting the PSC by a conservative 15% (Symes, 2006).  However, 
future third-party sales may further offset the MoD’s cost.  This payment mechanism 
limits the potential cost to the MoD by setting their take-or-pay rate, but does not 
limit profit-sharing potential generated by third-party usage.   Traditional military 
cyclic usage could be dampened by third-party revenue.  This type of contractual 
obligation displays the potential value to the government involved in using private-
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Summary 
The MSHATF project is an example of the build/own/operate, or COCO 
model.  It is positioned at the right end of the risk spectrum in Figure 1 where risk 
and responsibility are transferred to the private sector.  The contractor bears the 
entire risk burden and does not receive revenue until the project is effectively 
operating within specified tolerances.  By placing all of the financial risk on the 
shoulders of the contractor, the government creates a strong incentive for the 
awarded contractor to consistently meet milestones and complete them at or below 
cost. 
The government has demonstrated over time an inability to effectively 
mitigate risk, resulting in frequent project delays and cost overages.  The MSHATF 
projects provide true value-for-money by shifting the risk burden to the contactor 
during early unpredictable phases such as construction.  The private sector has 
been able to develop techniques to deal with risk so that the companies that are still 
in business are truly efficient risk managers.  Finally, the MSHATF projects bundle a 
long-term service contract with the financing and construction efforts, providing a 
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Conclusion 
PFI can be a very attractive alternative to traditional public financing and 
procurement.  Throughout this research, several themes are evident.  These are 
similar to those found in an article by Andrew Kaye.  In his November 2000 article, 
there are three high-level criteria for attracting private-sector participation in 
financing government acquisitions:   
1. Achieving good value-for-money as compared to other procurement 
options,   
2. Where workable service can be purchased with appropriate risk 
transfers and payment mechanisms, 
3. Where there is a strong probability of negotiating a reasonable deal for 
both the public and private sectors in an acceptable time scale. (Kaye, 
2000) 
According to Serco’s Vice President of Strategic Development, Simon 
Chapman, “The key to PFI is the acceptable transfer of risk to both sides.  It is a 
mutual decision made by each side in the negotiation process” (Chapman, 2006).  
The public sector can benefit greatly by taking advantage of the ability of the private 
sector to manage risk.   
Achieving good value-for-money or lifecycle costs can be very difficult.  There 
are six primary drivers for value-for-money that is key to PFI/PPP contracts: 
1. Risk transfer 
2. Output base specification 
3. Long-term nature of contracts 
4. Performance measurement and incentives 
5. Competition 
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Critics of this method of financing cite that the government’s low borrowing 
rate precludes other financing arrangements involving payments over long periods.  
They further point out that these arrangements are actually bad for the country 
because they add to the public debt.  PFI proponents’ counter argument is that these 
innovative financing arrangements transfer risk from the public sector to the private 
sector, cost overruns and schedule slips are far less frequent and less severe.  
Since private capital is invested and a return is not earned until the project is 
complete, experience proves that a preponderance of PFI projects are actually 
completed on-time and within budget.  Further, cost estimates for many government 
procurement programs are inaccurate, and may be “low balled” to gain 
Congressional approval.  While the project’s cost is small, experience shows that 
cost growth is a reality, and cost overruns make even the most simple and 
repeatable programs more expensive.  Therefore, the key issue is whether the 
efficiency gains of PPPs offset the higher cost of private-sector borrowing.   
There is no question that the UK has placed strong reliance on PFI projects.  
There are even proposals that private financing be given priority over the use of 
public funds.  The UK national security has benefited from PFI projects that have 
provided government capabilities that would not have been funded otherwise or 
whose funding would have precluded other projects.  In a world of ever-tightening 
budgets, the US should at least examine this financing option to free-up budget 
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Appendix : Risk Allocation Matrix MSHATF 
Risk Borne by MoD Borne by Contractor 
Risks in relation to the land on 
which the facility is to be built 
Ability to grant a leasehold 
interest in the site (determined 
before contract award) 
Obligations under the lease in 
respect of utilities, security etc. 
Ability to obtain planning 
permission (obtained before 
contract award) 
Compliances with building 
regulations, CDM etc. 
Most risks in relations to utility 
failure etc. remain with the 
contractor despite MoD 
obligations under lease 
Delayed in-service date for the 
Merlin Mk 3 aircraft 
MoD will pay Take or Pay 
amounts as contracted even if 
it does not yet require the 
training service 
Income above Take or Pay is 
still at risk 
In practice contractor and MoD 
should have agreed revised 
simulator timetable to suit both 
parties 
Availability of aircraft data and 
other intellectual property 
MoD assisting contractor to 
obtain but no liability 
Contractor responsible for 
obtaining what it need to fulfill 
the programme 
Change MoD pay for additional 
databases and for MoD-driven 
changes in aircraft 
specification after a freeze 
date 
Contractor pays for wide-
spread changes in 
requirements (e.g. Federal 
Aviation Authority changes to 
simulator standards) and 
contractor-proposed changes 
Several changes known to be 
in the pipeline to be dealt with 
by the contractor at no charge 
to MoD 
Political Risk MoD meets costs if the facility 
is sequestered in a crisis 
Take or Pay commits MoD to 
certain usages even if 
requirements change 
Contractor is exposed to 
changes in income above take 
or Pay resulting from changes 
in the MoD requirement (e.g. 
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